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Abstract This paper gives a formal elaboration of the
theory of legal reasoning and argumentation that was
described in Hage et al. [1994]. Legal reasoning is
considered to be procedural, and the way this procedure is
modeled is a two person dialogue. Basic elements of this
two person dialogue are defined, such as moves, and rules
are formulated that describe how dialogues run.
1. Introduction
The attractiveness of modeling law as a dialogue has
recently been demonstrated in a number of papers [Aleven
and Ashley 1992, Loui 1992, Nitta et al. 1993, Gordon
1994]. Hage et al. [1994] describe a procedural approach to
legal reasoning, and model it as a dialogue. We give a
formal elaboration of this approach. The resulting model is
called DiaLaw.
We will briefly motivate the reasons for our approach of
legal reasoning; for more discussion we refer to: Hage et al.
[1992], where the theory behind DiaLaw was introduced;
Leenes et al. [1994], where discourse rules including rules
for commitment were formulated; and Hage et al. [1994],
where the number of discourse rules was extended, and the
theory was used to characterise hard cases. The aim of this
paper is to work out the theory in more detail and make it
sufficiently precise to serve as a model for implementation.
We define basic elements of the dialogue, such as moves,
and formulate rules that describe how dialogues run.
There are several reasons why legal reasoning is to be
modeled as a dialogue.
• Dialogues fit in nicely with legal practice. Besides
trials, even situations of which one does not
immediately think about as dialogues, can be
considered as such. For instance, the reasoning of a
lawyer can be seen as a dialogue in which he defends
his point of view against possible counter arguments of
an imaginary opponent. In tackling attacks of his
opponent, he strengthens his own plea [cf. Skalak and
Rissland 1992].
• Dialogues make it easy to take the division of the
burden of proof into account [Gordon 1993b, p. 4, and
p. 120f]. For instance, the public offender has to show
the guilt of a criminal suspect, and not the suspect
himself. In a dialogue this has a natural translation: the
one that makes a claim has the burden of proof.
• The nature of law is purely procedural [cf. Rawls
1971]. There is no law except as the result of applying
legal rules, principles etc. to concrete cases.
Consequently there is no independent criterium to
evaluate the outcome of the application other than
applying the same procedure again. Since legal
procedures are not fully determinate, different
applications of the same procedure may lead to
different outcomes. As long as the procedure, that is
best modeled as a dialogue [cf. Alexy 1978], is
followed correctly, neither outcome is preferred above
another one. Only institutionalized outcomes, as the
verdict of a court, have special authority.
Material rules of law can be seen as procedural rules, but
they do not exhaust the rules that govern legal procedures.
We do not intend to model material rules of law. In this
paper a general framework is offered, that can be filled with
specific domain rules. The framework is meant to assist in
analyzing legal decisions afterwards (e.g. of courts), and in
constructing a rational justification for a solution of a legal
conflict.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First we
give an informal overview of the setting of dialogues. Next
the dialogical framework is presented, followed by an
informal discussion of the language used during a dialogue.
How the framework can be used is shown by some
examples. After a discussion of the rules that govern the
example dialogues, the paper concludes with a discussion of
related work, in particular Gordon's Pleadings Game.
2. The setting of dialogues
The dialogue is modeled as a two person game, in which
both players can make moves. The players express in their
moves an illocutionary act with a propositional content
[Searle 1969]. The illocutionary acts a player has at his
disposal are 'claim', 'question', 'accept', 'withdraw', and
'arbiter'. The propositional content can be any (legal)
sentence. The first move of the dialogue is always a claim of
a sentence by one of the players. Suppose the player Bert
claims that Tyrell is a killer. At that moment Bert starts a
dialogue.
Bert: Tyrell is a killer
In the consecutive moves players react to the sentences
claimed by their opponent, or they adduce sentences
pleading for or against earlier claimed sentences. For
instance, Ernie can do several things in the second move. He
can accept that Tyrell is a killer, ask why (question) Tyrell is
a killer, or even claim that Tyrell is not a killer at all.
2.1 Levels in the dialogue
A dialogue have different levels. The initial level is 0. The
level increases if a sentence is questioned. So after Ernie
questioned Tyrell being a killer, the level becomes 1. On this
new level sentences are adduced that are supposed to be
arguments for or against the sentence on the previous level.
For example:
Bert: Tyrell is a killer (0-level)
Ernie: What makes you think so (0-level)
Bert: His wife was shot (1-level)
The level decreases if a sentence is accepted, or withdrawn.
In that case the dialogue returns to the level on which this
sentence was claimed. So if after some moves Ernie accepts
that Tyrell's wife was shot (which of course is not meant as
a value judgment!), the dialogue continues at the first level.
Bert: His wife was shot (1-level)
some time later in the dialogue......
Ernie: I accept his wife was shot (e.g. 3-level)
Bert: Tyrell stood next to the dead body
with a smoking gun (1-level)
Bert continues the dialogue by adducing a new argument
why Tyrell is the killer, namely that Tyrell was found next
to the dead body with a smoking gun. This new argument is
needed, because the single fact that Tyrell's wife was shot is
not sufficient for Ernie to accept that Tyrell is a killer.
2.2 Commitment
Commitment plays an important role in the dialogue.
Commitment to a sentence originates from claiming a
sentence, or from accepting a sentence claimed by the
opponent. In the last example Bert is committed to "Tyrell is
a killer", both Bert and Ernie are committed to "his wife was
shot", and finally Bert is committed to the 'smoking gun'-
argument. Commitment terminates by withdrawing a
sentence. So if Bert withdraws "Tyrell is a killer", he is no
longer committed to that sentence.
The commitments of a player limit the moves he can make.
An example of such a limitation is that a player may neither
claim, nor accept a sentence, when he is committed to the
negation of that sentence. For example, Bert is not allowed
to claim that Tyrell is not a killer.
The goal for each player is to convince his opponent of the
correctness of the sentences he claims. To avoid that the
dialogue remains an informal talk, a player needs some
means to force his opponent to accept a sentence. This is
what is called forced commitment, and plays a crucial role
in the dialogue. Forced commitment is comparable to
derivation in a monological logic, and occurs when a player
is forced accept a sentence, due to the sentences he is
already committed to.
3. The dialogical framework
In the next definitions dialoguemoves, the commitment
store, and finally the dialogue itself are introduced. We use
the following notation. If a variable V is used then V ≠ V’,
unless indicated otherwise. If the value of a variable is
irrelevant, this is indicated with an underscore ( _ ). In some
cases it is necessary to make a distinction between a
sentence and the negation of that sentence. If a sentence is
S, the negation is ~S. When a sentence can be either S, or
~S, we use a bold face type: S. The reason for using S is that
otherwise several rules would be twice longer. A double
negation of a sentence (~~S) is considered to be the
sentence itself, so ~~S = S.
3.1 The dialogue move
The central notion in a dialogue is a move. In a move a
player performs an illocutionary act concerning some
sentence. The move is on a particular level. Therefore a
move consists of a term P for the player, a term A for the
illocutionary act, a term S for the sentence, and a term L for
the level. The level does not give enough information for a
(computationally) efficient representation. Therefore an
element B is needed that indicates which sentence the move
is an argument for, or reaction to. Besides, because there
can be more arguments for, or reactions to a statement they
are counted by the final term T. For instance Bert's 'smoking
gun'-argument is on the first level the second argument for
"Tyrell is a killer". This leads us to the following definition.
Definition 1 - the dialogue move
A dialogue move Mi (i>0) is (P, A, S, L, B, T), where
P ∈ {player1, player2},
A ∈ {claim, question, accept, withdraw, arbiter},
S, B ∈ Language,
L, T ∈ Ν (set of natural numbers).
The value of the variable 'i' is fixed by the dialogue (def. 3)
and indicates the number of the move. So M1 is the first
move of the dialogue, M2  the second, etc. As we can see a
dialogue move Mi is a 6-tuple, where
• P identifies the player.
• A indicates the illocutionary act, being one of a five
element set:
a. claim: player P claims a sentence S;
b. question: player P questions the sentence S;
c. accept: player P accepts a sentence S;
d. withdraw: player P withdraws a sentence S;
e. arbiter: player P calls in the arbiter to decide
about a sentence S.
• S is the propositional content of the illocutionary act.
The language is the set of all (legal) sentences. The
language is not formally worked out in this paper, but
informally described in section 4.
• L is the level of the move. How these levels change is
elaborated in the rules.
• B is the sentence the move Mi is a reaction to, or
provides an argument for.
• T counts the moves about the sentence B, on a
particular level L.
The smoking gun argument of Bert would thus be
represented as:  (Bert, claim, "Tyrell stand next to the dead
body with a smoking gun", 1, Tyrell is a killer, 2).
3.2 The commitment store
Through certain moves players become committed to
sentences. Commitment restricts a player in his moves, and
commitment of the opponent can be used to force him to
accept, or withdraw sentences. Therefore, it is important to
store those commitments [cf. MacKenzie 1979]. The
commitment of the players is stored in the commitment
store, which is defined as follows.
Definition 2 - the commitment store
A commitment store Ci (i≥0) is a set of elements (P, S),
where P ∈ {player1, player2} and S ∈ Language.
The set of disputed sentences Oi is the subset of Ci, with
the property that
(P, S) ∈ Oi, iff (P, S) ∈ Ci and (P', S) ∉ Ci.
C0 = ∅
The commitment store exists of elements (P, S), which
means that a player P is committed to a sentence S. Oi is the
subset of Ci that contains the sentences the players do not
agree upon. As we will see later, the dialogue continues as
long as there are still elements in Oi.
C0 is defined empty. How the content of the commitment
store is settled after each move is elaborated in rule 1.
3.3 The dialogue
Not only the effects of moves in terms of commitment are
stored, but also the moves themselves. This record of moves
is defined as the dialogue.
Definition 3 - the dialogue
A dialogue Di  is a totally ordered set of i (1 ≤ i ≤ last)
elements Mi .
D1 = {(player1, claim, S, 0, dialog, 1)}.
For 1 < i < last: Di = Di-1 ∪ {Mi}
The end of the dialogue is by definition reached, if after a
move Mlast, Olast becomes empty, so Dlast = Dlast-1 ∪
{Mlast}, Olast = ∅.
Dlast is called complete. Di  (i < last) is called incomplete.
A dialogue is defined as a set of moves. D1 defines the first
move of a dialogue: player1 claims a sentence (S), and the
level is 0. Since this is the first move, B is not a reaction to,
neither an argument for a previous sentence, but
conventionally defined as "dialog". As a consequence T is 1.
Every dialogue set Di  (i >1) results from adding a move Mi
to an already existing dialogue set Di-1. Which moves
exactly can be added to a particular dialogue set is laid
down in the rules. The only dialogue set to which no moves
can be added, is Dlast. Dlast originates if a move causes an
empty set of disputed sentences (Olast). This occurs when
there is agreement about the truth/falseness of the sentence
that was claimed in the first move. Only then a dialogue is
considered to be complete.
4. The language
The language of the dialogues are sentences comparable to
fact-clauses in Prolog. Sentences are for instance: law,
conference(icail), capital(State, City), participant(lodder,
conference(icail)), but also "I did not shoot the deputy". An
uppercase is a variable, a lowercase is a term. So in
capital/2, State and City can be instantiated, while icail is
fixed in conference/1.
The rules of the dialogue presented later contain some
special sentences that are based on Reason Based Logic
(RBL). [Hage and Verheij, 1995]. Only by using those
sentences, it is possible to force the opponent to accept your
point of view. So although sentences of FOPL are elements
of the language, forced commitment (see 2.2) is not based
on these sentences. Before introducing the special RBL-
sentences, we will briefly outline a slightly adapted version
of the theory of RBL.
A sentence can be derived, if the reasons for the conclusion
outweigh the reasons against the conclusion. In order to
decide which reasons win, they have to be weighed. This
weighing takes place on the basis of extra information: a
weighing sentence 'outweighs'.
How does a reason originate? If a rule is valid and that rule's
condition is satisfied, you have a reason to apply the rule.
But there can also be reasons against applying the rule, for
instance that applying the rule is against the rule's purpose.
Furthermore, there is a special case in which a rule simply
cannot apply, independent from existing reasons. That is
when a rule is excluded. A rule is for instance excluded, if a
case is without the scope of the rule.
When a rule applies, the rule's conditions constitute a reason
for the rule's conclusion. When there are more rules about
the same conclusion, or the negation of the conclusion, more
reasons can originate. The former constitute reasons for the
conclusion, the latter reasons against the conclusion.
This gives a short impression of how reasoning based on
reasons works. The sentences discussed below are necessary
to use this in a dialogue.
In the following holds that Cond, Concl ∈ Language,  and
that Procon ∈ {pro, con}:
• valid(rule(id, Cond, Concl)): a rule with a unique
identifier 'id' is valid. Cond represents the rule's
conditions, Concl the rule's Conclusion. Both Cond and
Concl can contain free variables.
• applies(rule(id, Cond, Concl)): the rule 'id' applies.
Cond is an instantiation of the rule's condition, Concl
the corresponding instantiation of the rule's Conclusion.
• excluded(rule(id, Cond, Concl)): the rule 'id' is
excluded. Cond, Concl are the same as in applies/1.
• reason(Cond, Concl, Procon): Cond is a reason pro or
con Concl.
• outweighs({Cond1, ..., Condn}, {Condn+1, ..., Condm},
Procon, Concl), where  m >= n. {Cond1, ..., Condn} is a
set of sentences Condi, originating from all elements
reason(Cond, Concl, Procon) both players are
committed to; {Condn+1, ..., Condm} is a set of sentences
Condi, originating from all elements reason(Cond,
Concl, ~Procon) both players are committed to. For
example, take the following reasons: reason(thief,
penal, pro), reason(recidivist, penal, pro), and
reason(minor, penal, con). Then the outweigh sentence
is: outweighs({thief, recidivist}, {minor}, pro, penal).
Besides, there is one special 'dialogue'-sentence that says
that it is impossible to make a particular claim. For instance,
if a player claims a sentence based on illegally obtained
evidence. In that case whether the sentence is true or false is
not relevant, it is simply not allowed to adduce this
sentence. This is modeled as follows.
• ~p(claim: X): it is not possible to claim X, where ~p
stands for 'not possible'.
5. Sample dialogues
The rules describe constraints concerning the course of a
dialogue in terms of allowed moves, and the consequences
of moves in terms of commitment. To facilitate the
understanding of the rules, we discuss some examples that
are based on the following case.
Tyrell is visiting a football game with two fellow-gang
members. Recently there was a shooting incident at a game,
and because one of the gang (not Tyrell) is wearing a heavy,
quilted coat --although the temperature is in the eighties--
the police suspects him. They are all searched, and on Tyrell
marihuana is found. Tyrell had been placed on probation
subject to amongst others the condition: "submit to a search
of his person and property, with or without a warrant, by
any law enforcement officer...". The searching officer was
unaware of the probation condition. Is the evidence illegally
obtained?
For the matter of convenience a sentence is referred to by
the number of the move it was claimed. So a sentence
claimed in the third move is represented as S3. We use the
common '>' to visually  express the level.
Bert and Ernie are discussing the Tyrell case. Bert says that
Tyrell is guilty, and Ernie fully agrees. This ends their
discussion. It is the shortest possible dialogue, modeled as
follows.
M1 = (Bert, claim, guilty(tyrell), 0, dialog, 1)
M2 = (Ernie, accept, guilty(tyrell), 0, guilty(tyrell), 1)
The dialogue starts as always with a claim by player1
(def. 3): Bert claims that tyrell is guilty; this is the first
move on level 0 about what is defined as dialog. In the
second move the level is still 0, and it contains the first
reaction to the first sentence, which is that Ernie accepts
guilty(tyrell). Since there is nothing in dispute anymore
(O2 = ∅), the dialogue is complete.
The other day after a good night sleep Bert wants to be
affirmed once more in his opinion of Tyrell's guilt. Bert
says: "Well Ernie, that Tyrell is guilty is not he". This time
Ernie is not so easygoing and counter-attacks by stating that
it is impossible to say that Tyrell is guilty. Bert is rather
surprised and asks Ernie what makes him change his mind.
M1 = (Bert, claim, guilty(tyrell), 0, dialog, 1)
M2 = (Ernie, claim, ~p(claim: guilty(tyrell)), 0, S1, 1)
M3 = (Bert, question, ~p(claim: guilty(tyrell)), 0, S2, 1)
In the second move Ernie claims the impossibility of
Bert's claim. On level 0 this is the first reaction to
guilty(Tyrell). Bert questions Ernie's claim. On level 0
this is the first reaction to ~p(claim: guilty(tyrell)).
Ernie gave the whole case a second thought, and concluded
that because the evidence for Tyrell's guilt is illegally
obtained, you may not claim that Tyrell is guilty. Bert wants
to know why. Ernie starts his defense by claiming the
validity of a rule that says "if guilt is based on illegal
evidence, it may not be claimed". Bert agrees to that rule.
When Ernie continues to say that the evidence was in fact
illegally obtained, Bert wants to know why.
M4 = >(Ernie, claim, reason(illegally_ob_ev(tyrell),
~p(claim: guilty(tyrell)), pro), 1, S2, 1)
M5 = >(Bert, question, S4, 1, S4, 1)
M6 = >>(Ernie, claim, valid(rule(1,
illegally_ob_ev(Person), ~p(claim: guilty(Person)), 2, S4, 1)
M7 = >>(Bert, accept, S6, 2, S6, 1)
M8 = >>(Ernie, claim, illegally_ob_ev(tyrell), 2, S4, 2)
M9 = >>(Bert, question, illegally_ob_ev(tyrell), 2, S6, 1)
Ernie claims that illegally obtained evidence concerning
Tyrell is a reason to forbid a claim stating that Tyrell is
guilty. Bert questions the claimed sentence. On the
second level Ernie claims the validity of a rule, which is
accepted by Bert. In the second argument on level 2
Ernie claims that the condition of the rule is satisfied.
Bert questions this claim.
Bert and Ernie continue their discussion. Ernie says: "Listen
Bert, don't you think that because Tyrell was not a suspect,
the evidence is not legal ". Bert admits this. This makes
Ernie happy, because he thinks he won the dispute about
the evidence. But then Bert reminds Ernie that because of
Tyrell's probation condition, he had to allow a search any
time. Ernie agrees, but still thinks that his argument is
stronger than Bert's one.
M10 = >>>(Ernie, claim, reason(not_suspect(tyrell),
illegally_ob_ev(tyrell), pro), 3, S8, 1)
M11 = >>>(Bert, accept, S10, 3, S10, 1)
M12 = >>>(Ernie, claim, outweighs({not_suspect(tyrell)},
∅, pro, S8), 3, S8, 2)
M13 = >>>(Bert, claim, reason(prob_cond(tyrell),
illegally_ob_ev(tyrell), con), 3, S12, 1)
M14 = >>>(Ernie, withdraw, S12, 3, S13, 1)
M15 = >>>(Ernie, claim, outweighs({not_suspect(tyrell)}, 
{prob_cond(tyrell)}, pro, S8), 3, S8, 3)
Ernie claims a reason, which is accepted by Bert.
Successively Ernie claims that this reason outweighs the
empty set of reasons. This claim of Ernie is decisive,
unless Bert knows another reason. Bert wants to avoid
commitment to S8, , and therefore claims a reason
against S8. Ernie immediately withdraws 'outweighs'. A
consequence of this withdrawal is that he becomes
committed to Bert's reason (see rule 1). Then Ernie
claims a new 'outweighs', with both reasons in it.
Bert wants to know why Ernie thinks his argument is
stronger than Bert's. Ernie cites a similar case by the court
of appeal of California. Bert is flabbergasted by this
argument, and mumbles: "You really got me Ernie, I
withdraw my initial claim about Tyrell's guilt".
M16 =>>>(Bert, question, S15, 3, S15, 1)
M17=>>>>(Ernie, claim, reason(Cal9214(outweighs(
{not_suspect(P)}, {prob_cond(P)}, pro,
 illegally_ob_ev(P))), S15, pro), 4, S15, 1)
M18 =>>>>(Bert, withdraw, S1, 4, S17, 1)
After Bert's question, Ernie adduces a reason that states
that in a verdict of the court of appeal of California in a
similar case the outcome was the same as Ernie thinks it
has to be. Although Bert is not forced to do so, he finds
the reason convincing enough to withdraw his initial
claim. This ends the dialogue, because the first claim is
decided.
Most lawyers will agree with the decision of the court of
appeal. Surprisingly the supreme court did not: they decided
that the evidence was legally obtained. So if Bert would
have been aware of this verdict, he could have won the
dialogue.
6. The dialogue rules
The definitions provide a framework for a dialogue. How a
dialogue actually runs depends on the player's moves. Recall
(def. 1) that a move is: (P, A, S, L, B, T). The rules describe
which player's turn to move it is (P), and how L, B, and T
change. Within certain constraints the player of the move
can choose an illocutionary act (A) and a propositional
content (S). What exactly is allowed depends on
commitment, and on previous moves.
6.1 Origin of commitment
The first rule works out by which moves and how the
commitment store Ci alters. If a player claims or accepts a
sentence, he becomes committed to that sentence. If a player
withdraws a sentence his commitment ends. Moreover, both
accept and withdraw can have further consequences for the
content of commitment store.
Rule 1
a. Ci = Ci-1 ∪ {(P, S)}, if Mi = (P, claim, S, _, _, _)
b.  If Mi = (P, withdraw, S, _, _, _) and
Mh = (P, claim, S, _, _, _) or;
Mi = (P, accept, S, _, _, _) and
Mh = (P', claim, S, _, _, _) (h<i)
then
let U be the set of elements to update the
commitment store, so that U = Oi-1 \ Oh-1,
let Udel be the subset of U, with the property that
if (P, Q) ∈ U then (P, Q) ∈ Udel,
let Uadd be the subset of U, with the property that
if (P', R) ∈ U, (P, R) ∈ Uadd,
so Ci = Ci-1 ∪ Uadd \ Udel.
c. Ci = Ci-1 in all other cases than under a, b.
Rule 1a: If a player claims a statement S, an element (P, S)
is added to the commitment store. Note that because the
first move is always a claim of a sentence by player1 (see
def. 3), C1 will contain the related element: (player1, S).
Rule 1b: The sentences claimed between the claim of a
sentence S and its acceptance or withdrawal, are
(considered to be) direct, or indirect arguments for (or
against) S. The status of those (in)direct arguments that are
still disputed at the moment of acceptance/withdrawal
(defined as elements of U) is dealt with the following way. If
the withdrawing player P claimed sentences after he claimed
S, and those sentences are still disputed, then his
commitment to all those sentences Q including S ends (the
elements of Udel). Furthermore, he becomes committed to all
disputed sentences R claimed by player P' after the claim of
S. If player P' claimed S, and player P accepts S the same
happens, except that (P, S) is now an element of Uadd in
stead of Udel.
Rule 1c: After any other move the commitment store
remains the same.
6.2 General conditions
In the second rule necessary (but not always sufficient)
conditions are formulated for all acts, except question. Every
Mi which occurs in the rules with the exception of moves
with the act question must obey rule 2. For instance, if a
rule concerns withdraw, you should always keep in mind
the conditions formulated here.
Rule 2
a. Mi  = (P, claim, S, _, B, _) is only possible, if
(P, claim, S, _, _, _) ∉ Di-1,
(_, S) ∉ Ci-1,
            where S = ~S only if  B = S.
b. Mi  = (P, accept, S, _, _, _) is only possible, if
(P', S) ∈ Oi-1;
c. Mi  = (P, withdraw, S, _, _, _) is only possible, if
(P, S) ∈ Oi-1;
d. Mi  = (_, arbiter, S, _, _, _) is only possible, if
(_, S) ∈ Oi-1.
Rule 2a forbids repetition of arguments and contradiction
[cf. Alexy 1978, p. 234f.]. First, it says that a player who
claims a sentence, cannot claim the same sentence again.
Second, it says that if at least one of the players is
committed to a sentence, it is not possible to claim that
sentence. Finally you can only claim the negation of S, if it
is a reaction to S.
Rule 2b: A player P can only accept a sentence, if he is not
committed to that sentence, and the other player is. It is not
allowed to accept the negation of a sentence (~S), for the
following reason. From rule 2a follows that ~S can only be
claimed as a reaction to the claim of S. So, if a player was
allowed to accept ~S, the commitment store would contain S
and ~S for the same player.
Rule 2c: A player can only withdraw a sentence, if he is
committed to that sentence, and the other player is not.
Note: if P withdraws S and (P', ~S) ∈ Ci-1, P becomes
committed to ~S.
Rule 2d: A player can call the arbiter, if only one player is
committed to this sentence. This means that the arbiter only
decides on issues there is no agreement about, which fit
with what an arbiter does in real life situations.
6.3 Moves after a claim
The third rule is about what moves can follow after a claim.
Any act can follow after a claim. Only the possibility of
counter-claims is very restricted.
Rule 3
If Mi-1 = (P, claim, S, L, B, T) then
Mi = (P', A, S', L, S, 1), where
a. S' = S for A = question;
b. S' = S is possible for A ∈ {accept, arbiter}
c. A = claim is only  possible, if 
1. S' = reason(_, _, B), and
S = outweighs(_, _, _, B);
2. S' = ~S, or S' = ~p(claim: S), and
S ≠ ~p(claim: B).
Rule 3a: The level remains the same, and the next move is
the first reaction to what was claimed. Basically, the player
P' can react with any act. If he questions a sentence S, the
propositional content of the question must be the sentence S.
Rule 3b: If after a claim a sentence is accepted, this can be
the same sentence (bear in mind rule 2b!), but can be as
well an earlier claimed sentence.
Rule 3c: In only a few situations a claim can be the
successor of a claim:
1. If the player P claims that the reasons so far dip the
balance in his advantage, the other player P' can claim
another reason in order to influence the balance.
2. After a claim of a sentence S (which is not of the form
~p(claim: B)), the other player can claim the negation of
that sentence, or claim that it is impossible to claim S.
6.4 Moves after a question
This rule is about the only situation in which the level of the
dialogue increases: when a sentence is questioned. The next
move is the first argument for the questioned sentence. Any
act, except question is allowed. Question is forbidden,
because this would mean that a player questions a sentence
he just claimed.
Rule 4
If Mi-1 = (P, question, S, L, _, _), then
Mi = (P’, A, _, L+1, S, 1), where A ≠ question.
6.5 Moves after an acceptance or withdraw
This rule is about what move comes after accept or
withdraw. It is the only situation in which the level of the
dialogue decreases. Accept and withdraw are taken together,
because their successors are largely similar. If a player
accepts or withdraws a sentence, the dialogue returns to the
level the sentence was claimed at. The next move is either a
new argument for, or a new reaction to the same sentence as
the accepted/withdrawn sentence was an argument for or
reaction to.
Rule 5
a. Let (P, claim, S, L, B, T) ∈ Di-2, and
Mi-1  = (P', accept, S, L', _, _), (L' ≥ L) then
1. Mi = (P', withdraw, B, L, B, T+1) for 
1. S = ~p(claim: B)
2. S = reason(_, X, _), where
B = outweighs(_, _, _, X);
2. in all other cases Mi = (P, A, _, L, B, T+1), where
A ≠ question
b. Let (P, claim, S, L, B, T) ∈ Di-2, and
Mi-1 = (P, withdraw, S, L', _, _) (L'  ≥ L) then
Mi = (P, A, S' L, B, T+1), where:
1. A can be any act in the following cases 
1. S = ~p(claim: B)
if A = claim then S' = ~B;
2. S = reason(_, B, _), and
(P', outweighs(_, _, _, B) ∈ Ci-1
if A = claim then S' = reason(_, B, _);
3. S = ~B
      if A = claim then S' = ~p(claim: B)
2. A ≠ question in all other cases.
Rule 5a.1: If a player accepts that it is not possible to claim
a sentence B, he is forced to undo his claim by withdrawing
B. Similar is the case in which a player accepts a reason of
his opponent that was claimed according to rule 3c.1. Since
there are now more reasons, outweighs concerning X is no
longer true and thus he must withdraw it. Rule 5a.2: If a
sentence S is accepted the dialogue continues with a new
claim, or any other act except question by the same player
that claimed S.
Rule 5b.1: The three types of withdrawn sentences S  were
claimed as a reaction to a claim of the opponent. The player
P is allowed to react again to the claim of his opponent.
First, if a player withdraws that it is impossible to claim a
sentence. Second, if he withdraws the reason that was
meant to counterclaim outweighs  Finally, if he withdraws
the negation of a sentence (~S). (see rule 3c)
Rule 5b.2: If a sentence S (for ~S see 5b.1) is withdrawn,
then the next move is the same as after S is accepted. (see
under a.2)
6.6 Moves after a call for the arbiter
In this paper is not worked out on what grounds the arbiter
decides. If the arbiter is called to decide about a sentence,
the decision of the arbiter consist of one, or two consecutive
moves. These moves have as a result that neither the
sentence the arbiter is called upon, nor its negation is any
longer disputed.
Rule 6
If Mi-1 = (_, arbiter, S, L, B, T) then
a. Mi  = (P', accept, S, L, B, T+1), or
b. Mi = (P, withdraw, S, L, B, T+1).
If the arbiter is called  to decide about a sentence, he has
two options:
- let the player P', whose opponent claimed S, accept S.
- let the player P, who claimed S, withdraw S.
6.7 Constraints related to Reason Based
Logic
The rules 7 and 8 are about special conditions for the use of
RBL-sentences. Rule 7 is about some cases of forced
commitment because of RBL-sentences. Rule 8 formulates
general conditions for using reason and outweighs.
Rule 7
Let (Concl, Y) ∈ {(Concl, pro), (~Concl, con)},
then
a. Mi = (P, claim, excluded(rule(id, Cond, Concl)), _, _, _),
only if (P, applies(rule(id, Cond, Concl))), and
(P, reason(Cond, Concl, Y)) ∉ Ci-1.
b. Mi = (P, claim, applies(rule(id, Cond, Concl)), _, _, _), 
or Mi = (P, claim, reason(Cond, Concl, Y), _, _, _),
only if (P, excluded(rule(id, Cond, Concl))) ∉ Ci-1.
c. If Mi-1 = (P, claim, S, _, _, _), then
Mi = (P', accept, S, _, _, _) in the following cases:
1. S = reason(Cond, Concl, Y), and
(P', applies(rule(id, Cond, Concl)) ∈ Ci-1;
2. S = reason(Cond Λ valid(rule(id, Cond,
 Concl)), applies(rule(id, Cond, Concl)), pro),
 and
{(P', valid(rule(id, Cond, Concl))),
(P', Cond)} ⊂ Ci-1;
3. S = outweighs(_, ∅, _, Concl), unless
Mi = (P', claim, reason(_, Concl, _), _, _, _).
d. Let (P', S) ∈ Oi-2, and (P, S) ∈ Ci-1, then:
1. If S = excluded(rule(id, _ , _)), and
(P, applies(rule(id, _, _)) ∈ Ci-1,  then
Mi = (P, withdraw, applies(rule(id, _, _)), _, _, _), 
2. If S ∈ {Cond, valid(rule(id, Cond, Concl)},
T = reason(Cond Λ valid(rule(id, Cond, Concl)), 
applies(rule(id, Cond, Concl), pro)), and
{(P, S), (P, S'), (P', T) } ⊂ Ci-1,
    then  Mi = (P, accept, T, _, _, _)
3. If S = applies(rule(id, Cond, Concl), and
(P', reason(Cond, Concl, Y))  ∈ Ci-1, then
Mi = (P, accept, reason(Cond, Concl, Y), _, _, _)
Rule 7a: In this rule the claim of some special RBL-
sentences is restricted. A player cannot claim that a rule is
excluded, if he is committed to the fact that the rule applies,
or to the reason based on that rule. Rule 7b is about the
reversed case.
Rule 7c is about moves in which the player is forced to
accept the sentence S, if S is claimed by his opponent. If a
player is committed to the fact that a rule applies, he is
forced to accept the reason based on the rule (c.1). If a
player is committed to a valid rule and the initiation of the
condition of that rule, he is forced to accept that both
sentences are a reason to apply the rule (c.2). Because a not
empty set of reasons is weight against an empty set of
reasons, player P is forced to accept outweighs, unless he
claims a reason. (c.3; see Rule 3c)
Rule 7d is about forced accept/withdraw concerning some
RBL-sentences that contradict each other. If player P
becomes committed to that a rule is excluded, he must
withdraw that the rule applies. This is because it is
impossible that a rule applies, and at the same is
excluded.(d.1) If player P became just committed to both
sentences (he just accepted the other one) then he has to
accept that both sentences are a reason for applying the rule.
(d.2) If player P became committed to that a rule applies,
then he must accept the reason originating from that rule.
(d.3)
Rule 8
a. Let (P, claim, S, L, _, _) ∈ Di-1  and L' = L + 1, then:
1. Mi  = (P, claim, reason(_, S, _), L', _, _) is possible
2. Mi = (P, claim, outweighs(_, _, _, S), L', _, _)
is only possible if (_, reason(_, S, _)) ∈ Ci -1.
b. Mi = (P, claim, outweighs(_, _, pro, S) _, _, _), and
(P', claim, outweighs(_, _, con, S) _, _, _),
are only possible if (P, S) ∈ Oi-1.
c. If (P', outweighs(_, _, _, S)) ∈ Oi-2, and
(P, outweighs(_, _, _, S)) ∈ Ci-1, then:
1. Mi  = (P, accept, S, _, _, _), if (P', S) ∈ Oi-1
2. Mi  = (P, withdraw, S, _, _, _), if (P, S) ∈ Oi-1
In this rule is about the important sentences reason and
outweighs.
Rule 8a. A reason or outweighs claim about S is only
possible one level lower than S was claimed (so if S was
questioned and still is disputed). In order to make the
sentence outweighs significant, there must be at least one
reason about S.
Rule 8b. The player that claimed S, can only claim that the
reasons in favor of S outweigh the reasons against S. A
player whose opponent claimed S, can only claim the
opposite.
Rule 8c. If a player P becomes committed to an outweighs
claim about S -other than after claiming it- the commitment
of S is taken care of. Outweighs namely means that because
of the available reasons you can conclude S (or ~S). For
example, let's say player P claimed ~S, and later this player
becomes committed to outweighs(_, _, _, S). Then player P
must accept S, since he accepted the outweighs claim which
says that the reasons for outweigh the reasons against S.
The other rule is about the reversed case.
7. Related work
In this section we will briefly discuss some related research
on arguments, philosophy, and dialogues. We end with a
more extensive comparison with Gordon [1993b], because
the Pleadings Game is most relevant to the present model.
There is a lot of research on (legal) argument. An early
model of argument is that of Toulmin [1958, p. 99f], whose
diagram to represent arguments is still very popular [e.g.
Bench Capon et al. 1992, Cavalli-Sforza and Suthers 1994].
Although researchers on legal arguments [e.g. Ashley 1990,
Skalak and Rissland 1992, Prakken 1993, Hage and Verheij
1995] agree, to put it simply, that legal reasoning is more
than applying legal rules in a 'la bouche de la loi' way, they
do not share the -in our eyes essential- procedural point of
view.
In philosophy Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca [1971]
introduced a rhetorical approach to reasoning. In their
theory an attempt to justify a statement is rational if the
speaker succeeds in convincing his public. In this rhetorical
approach the public has a passive role. Habermas [1973]
brought the public to life, and proposed to represent
reasoning as a dialogue. Alexy [1978] picked up this idea.
He formulated a set of rules for general discourse and
additional rules for legal discourse.
Dialogue games have a long tradition. Already in the Middle
Ages the Obligation Game [cf. Hamblin 1970] was used to
test the knowledge of students. If during a dialogue with
their teacher the students were capable to avert
contradiction, they passed their exam. Lorenz [1961]
designed a dialogue game in which the proponent has the
burden of proving that his initial locution is a tautology.
Rescher [1977, p. xiv] "... seeks to explain and substantiate
... the utility of dialectic as an instrument of inquiry". The
resulting dialogue model was recently formalized by Brewka
[1994]. In the Netherlands the linguists Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst [1982] formulated rules that participants in
discussions should observe, if their goal is to solve conflicts
in a reasonable manner. There are legal elaborations of
those rules, for instance for civil and penal procedures of
jurisdiction [Feteris 1989]. Bench-Capon et al. [1991, 1992]
explored dialogues not particular for the legal field, but used
them to improve the way knowledge-based systems provide
explanation. In a dialogue the user of the KBS can specify
his interest, and therefore gets the information he
particularly wants instead of a standard explanation. Loui
[1992] defines four protocols for his dialogical framework
with a climbing degree of complexity, allowing for instance
meta arguments only in the highest level. Nitta et al. [1993]
describe a knowledge-based system for trial reasoning. In
this model, dialogues are between two agents (the plaintiff
and the defendant) with different goals, views and reasoning
strategies. St-Vincent and  Poulin [1994] use interaction
between groups of agents to determine (on the basis of
majority of agents, unanimity, etc.) the meaning of vague
legal concepts.
7.1 DiaLaw vs. The Pleadings Game
We do not precisely describe how the Pleadings Game
works, rather we point out the differences between the
Pleadings Game and DiaLaw on the following important
items: purpose of the game, commitment, effectiveness and
termination, arguments and questions.
purpose of the game
The purpose of the Pleadings Game is to identify the issues
of a case, both legal and factual, by means of a dialogue
between two players (the plaintiff and the defendant). The
scope of the game is civil pleading, and to test the game a
small domain (secured transactions) is used. DiaLaw is a
general model of legal reasoning, meant to analyse legal
verdicts and assist in constructing legal decisions in a
procedure.
commitment
In DiaLaw rule 1 about commitment seems unfair. Why
follows commitment to sentences you never wanted to
become committed to? We mentioned the status of those
sentences: (in)direct arguments. Nevertheless, this status -
since irrelevant statements may be claimed- is not such a
strong justification for that rule. Therefore we are working
on a way to handle commitment more elegantly. Gordon
handles commitment definitely better. After for instance
conceding a claim, only the commitment to that claim
originates.
Commitment in the Pleadings Game also includes all
statements that are consequences of the player's statements.
The reason that DiaLaw does not perform this strengthening
of commitment is because derivation is solely based on
special RBL-sentences. The derivation for strengthening
commitment supposes demonstrative arguments, and the
special RBL-sentences supply non-demonstrative reasoning.
Once FOPL will be included (as it is in RBL), this
strengthening can become relevant as far as formulas of
FOPL are concerned.
effectiveness and termination
To focus discussion to only relevant statements, the
Pleadings Game uses the concept "issue". A player may only
make moves, if it is his first reaction to a statement of his
opponent, and this statement is about an issue. In DiaLaw
the sentences reason and outweighs can only be claimed, if
they are about a sentence that is still disputed (see rule 8).
Other sentences are not subject to a relevancy check. The
reason for this is that it is often hard to determine whether
an argument is relevant. What for one person is relevant, for
another maybe is not. In that way the Pleadings Game
maybe is to rigid.
The Pleadings Game ends if at the beginning of one's turn
there are no relevant statements to be answered. If there are
remaining issues, the parties go to trial. In the Trial Game
players don't make moves. A judge decides each issue in
favor of one of the players. DiaLaw ends only if the main
claim is decided. As analyzing tool this raises no problem: a
decision is reconstructed and the dialogue therefore is finite
by definition. As a system that assists in constructing
arguments, this can be considered ineffective. But, are real
life discussions not often ineffective? The difference is that
in real life a discussion often ends in an agreement to
disagree. Maybe this possibility should be added to DiaLaw.
arguments and questions
In legal reasoning there are often more arguments that plead
for, or against a statement, than only one. Gordon [1993a,
p. 14] recognizes this, but gives the players only the
possibility to adduce one, preferably the best, argument.
Not only a player who by mistake produced an argument
that could be defeated, although he might have more strings
to his bow, looses the conflict. Moreover, the situation when
one argument does not suffice to justify a conclusion, but
several accruing arguments do, cannot be dealt with.
[Verheij 1995; Hage and Verheij 1995] Both situations can
be handled in DiaLaw, since in DiaLaw more arguments
(reasons) can be adduced for a statement. If at one point the
balance dips in favor of the opponent, new arguments can
change this.
The players in the Pleadings Game adduce a complete
argument (from premises to conclusion). The argument is
allowed if a theorem prover has checked whether it is really
an argument. In DiaLaw an argument is built step by step
during the dialogue, and is as detailed as the opponent
demands. This comes closer to a procedural approach of
legal reasoning.
If you simply do not understand a statement, or do not have
an opinion about it, the only proper reaction is to ask for an
explanation. In that case you demand the opponent to clarify
his statement, without giving your opinion about the
statement. The Pleadings Game does not allow to question
statements.
8. Conclusion
This paper for the first time offers a full formalization of
allowed moves in legal discourse. Previously, Gordon
[1993b, p. 119f.; 1994] and Hage et al. [1994] gave only
the initial impetus towards a formalization.
The framework DiaLaw does not only allow 'normal'
reasoning with legal rules. It is also possible to deal with the
exclusion of rules, and with the weighing of reasons.
Besides, both case-based and rule-based reasoning can be
dealt with [Hage 1993].
The definitions and rules served as a model, that has been
implemented in Prolog. This program (also called DiaLaw)
checks whether the input of a player is allowed. If the move
is valid, the move is added to the dialogue, and the
commitment store is updated. Furthermore the level, and the
level related terms are instantiated. The program ends only
if the first claim is decided. In the future the implementation
could serve as a base for an intelligent tutoring system, in
which a computer player will debate with a student [Hage et
al. 1992; cf. Aleven and Ashley 1992]
Future research concerns the precise role of the arbiter, and
addition of specific domain rules.
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